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INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE
Amici Curiae respectfully submit this brief in support of
Petitioner, KSRInternational Co., because the judgment
below stems from the application of an obviousness test
whichis inconsistent with the patent statute, with this Court’s
precedent, and with goodpatent policy.l
Amici are fourteen law professors who teach and write
about intellectual property at law schools within the United
States and have an interest in the proper interpretation and
application of intellectual property law. Amici believe that
patent law should provide incentives to search for technological solutions that go beyondroutine advances. In contrast, the Federal Circuit’s incorrect interpretation of the
obviousness standard, as applied in this case, provides
incentives for seeking patent rights on obvious extensions of
existing technologies. The patenting of obvious extensions
of existing technologies has high social costs and is contrary
to the Constitutional purposeof the patent system.
This case provides the Court with an opportunity to overturn the Federal Circuit’s much-criticized current approachto
obviousness, which is at odds with the statutory language,
inconsistent with this Court’s precedent, and contrary to the
goals of the patent system. Unless this Court intervenes,
countless applications and issued patents on obvious technologies will continue to burden the U.S. Patent and TrademarkOffice, the federal courts, and the public at large.

I Bothparties haveconsentedto the filing of this brief andwritten
consentshavebeenfiled withthe clerk. Pursuantto this Court’sRule
37.6,amicirepresentthat this brief wasnot authoredin wholeor in part
bycounselfor anyparty,andthat nopersonor entity otherthanamiciand
their respectiveeducational
institutionshasmadea monetary
contribution
to the preparationor submission
of this brief. Thenamesof the educational institutionsare provided
for identificationpurposes
only,andthe
institutionshavenot reviewed
or approved
this brief.

2
SUMMARYOF THE ARGUMENT
The nonobviousness requirement for patentability is imposed so that patents will be granted only for significant
advances over previously knowntechnology. An appropriately tuned standard ensures that patents are awardedonly for
"unobvious developments which would not occur spontaneously from the application of... ordinary skill." Giles S.
Rich, The Principles of Patentability, 42 J. Pat. Off. Soc’y
75, 81-82 (1960). Patenting obvious advances which would
have occurred in the ordinary course of competitive research
and developmentcreates an unnecessary drag on innovation
through higher prices to consumers and transaction costs
associated with searching for, licensing, and enforcing these
unnecessary patents. The availability of patents on obvious
combinations overwhelmsthe Patent and TrademarkOffice
with applications for patents on obvious combinations of
previously existing technologies.
The statutory nonobviousnessstandard reflects "a careful
balance between the need to promote innovation and the
recognition that imitation and refinement through imitation
are both necessary to invention itself and the very lifeblood
of a competitive economy." Bonito Boats, lnc. v. Thunder
Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989). To strike this
balance while avoiding hindsight bias, Congress and this
Court have mandatedthat obviousness be assessed from the
perspective of the "person having ordinary skill in the art"
(PHOSlTA).
The Federal Circuit has adopted a test for obviousness
which is inconsistent with this Court’s precedent and allows
patents to issue on obvious inventions. The Federal Circuit’s
test denies a patent on a combinationof previously available
technology only whenthe patent examiner or a litigation
opponent can present evidence of a suggestion, motivation,
or teaching to combine in the prior art. Without such a

"suggestion to combine," a claimed invention is never
deemedobvious, regardless of the circumstances surrounding
its development.Whilethis "suggestion test" is framed as a
factual inquiry, it effectively swallowsthe legal inquiry into
obviousness and imposes an inappropriately low standard.
The suggestion test’s focus on evidence of what could be
done by combining the prior art marginalizes the PHOSITA,
equating ordinary skill with knowledgeand motivation and
ignoring the aspect of ordinary skill comprising routine
experimentation and application of ordinary tools, methods,
and problem-solvingabilities.
Because a prima facie showing of obviousness cannot be
madewithout evidence of a "suggestion to combine"prior art
references, the Federal Circuit’s approach also turns this
Court’s observation that the inventive context may be
relevant to assessing obviousness into a one-wayratchet of
"objective indicia of nonobviousness" which can be used
only in support of patent issuance. CompareGrahamv. John
Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966) ("[S]econdary considerations . . . might be utilized to give light to the circumstances surroundingthe origin of the subject matter sought to
be patented. As indicia of obviousness or nonobviousness,
these inquiries may have relevance.") with GambroLundia
AB v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 110 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed.
Cir. 1997) (referring to "the fourth prong of the obviousness
determination--the objective indicia of nonobviousness");
HughesTool Co. v. Dresser Inds., 816 F.2d 1549, 1556 (Fed.
Cir. 1987) (referring to "objective indicia of nonobviousness
(the so-called ’secondary considerations’"). Framedin this
way, the obviousness inquiry ignores social, economic, and
technical changes that might render particular advances
obviousuponthe application of ordinaryskill in the art.
Besides its substantive failings, the Federal Circuit’s approach fails to take advantage of patent examinerexpertise.
"[T]he primary responsibility for sifting out unpatentable
material lies in the Patent Office," Graham,383 U.S. at 18.
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Federal Circuit precedent requires patent examiners to
present evidence in the record whenseeking to rely on the
common
knowledgeof those skilled in the art or the nature of
the problemto be solved to meet the suggestion requirement.
See, e.g., In re Lee, 277 F.3d 1338, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
By imposing excessively stringent evidentiary requirements
and framing the ultimate judgment of obviousness as essentially a factual inquiry, the Federal Circuit’s approach
hampersthe PTO’sapplication of its expertise to the obviousness question. This is particularly unfortunate since the
ex parte nature of patent examination leaves the patent
examinersas the only available representatives of the "person
having ordinary skill in the art" during examination. Despite
these limitations imposedon the examiners’ ability to weed
out obvious patent claims, issued patents that combineprior
technology are afforded a presumptionof validity which can
be overcome only by clear and convincing evidence of a
suggestion, motivation, or teaching to combine.
Theperspective of the "person of ordinary skill in the art"
must be brought back into its rightful place in the legal
inquiry into obviousness. A robust inquiry into the level of
ordinary skill in the art--which considers not only what is
already knownin a particular field, but also what is within
the reach of ordinary skill, including routine experimentation
and application of tools, methods, and problem-solving
abilities--should be undertaken as a basis for the legal
assessment of obviousness.
Theconsideration given to the technical and social context
in which a claimed invention was made should expand to
incorporate factors suggesting that a claimed invention was
an obvious application of ordinary skill, rather than being
confined to a one-sided inquiry into indicia of nonobviousness. With the Grahamparadigm thus reinstated, the patentability standard would better serve its Constitutional
purpose of promotingtechnological progress.

ARGUMENT
I.

Obviousness is a Question of Law Incorporating
ImportantIssues of Innovation Policy

To obtain protection under federal patent law, technological developmentswithin the scope of statutory subject matter
under 35 U.S.C. § 101 must meet three substantive requirements, whichcan be summarizedas utility, novelty, and nonobviousness. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101 (utility), 102 (novelty),
and 103 (nonobviousness). As this Court has recognized,
[b]oth the novelty and the nonobviousnessrequirements of federal patent law are grounded
in the notion that concepts within the public
grasp, or those so obvious that they readily
could be, are the tools of creation available to
all. Theyprovide the baseline of free competition upon which the patent system’s incentive
to creative effort depends.
Bonito Boats, lnc. v. ThunderCraft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S.
141, 156 (1989). This legal standard has Constitutional
dimensions. "Innovation, advancement, and things which
add to the sumof useful knowledgeare inherent requisites in
a patent system which by constitutional
commandmust
’promote the Progress of... useful Arts.’ This is the standard expressed in the Constitution and it may not be ignored." Grahamv. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966)
(emphasisin original).
Becausethe novelty condition precludes patenting only if a
claimed invention is completelyanticipated by a single piece
of prior art, the requirement of nonobviousnessis the sole
provision which fully implementsthe core notion of patent
law that patents should be granted only for significant
advances over previously knowntechnology. Patents are
awarded as "an inducement, to bring forth new knowledge."
Graham,383 U.S. at 9. Thus, as articulated by one of the
principal drafters of the 1952 Patent Act, only "unobvious
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developments which would not occur spontaneously from the
application of... ordinary skill" are patentable. Giles S.
Rich, The Principles of Patentability, 42 J. Pat. Off. Soc’y
75, 81-82 (1960). Obvious developments "will be made
anyway, without the ’fuel of interest’ which the patent
system supplies." Id. Patenting combinations of what is
already knownthat would have been developed without the
patent incentive needlessly imposesthe costs of exclusivity
on the public.
To implement the core patent policy of granting patents
only on significant advances in knowledge,Congresschose a
standard embodiedin Section 103 of the Patent Act, which
denies patent protection when"the differences between the
subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such
that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious
at the time the invention was made to a person having
ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains." 35 U.S.C. § 103. The statutory standard embodies"a
careful balance between the need to promote innovation and
the recognition that imitation and refinement through imitation are both necessary to invention itself and the very
lifeblood of a competitive economy."Bonito Boats, 489 U.S.
at 146.
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has developed a different, and lower, standard than that embodiedin
the Patent Act. Rather than focus on what the person of
ordinary skill in the relevant art would find obvious, the
Federal Circuit’s test denies a patent only if there is evidence
of a specific "suggestion, teaching, or motivation to combine
the relevant prior art teachings in the manner claimed."
Appendixto Petition for Certiorari (hereinafter "Pet. App.")
at 6a (citing prior Federal Circuit authorities). This "suggestion test" is foundneither in the Patent Act nor in this Court’s
relevant precedent. It sets the patentability threshold below
what wouldbe appropriate to ensure that patents, on average,
are granted when they are needed to induce technological
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progress beyondthat which will occur as a matter of course
withoutthe patent incentive.
The ultimate question of whethera particular technological
advanceis sufficient to merit an awardof patent exclusivity
is a question of law. Graham,383 U.S. at 17, citing Great
A&PTea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 155
(1950). This is as it must be--the determination whether
"the difference between [a] new thing and what was known
before" is "sufficiently great to warrant a patent" is at bottom
a question of innovation policy. Graham,383 U.S. at 14-15,
quoting S. Rep. No. 82-1979 (1952) and H. R. Rep. No. 821923 (1952). Implicit in the legal interpretation of the
statutory phrase "wouldhave been obvious" is a determination of just how nonobvious a new development must be
before a patent is granted.
The baseline of free competition, coupled with first mover
advantages and other means of profiting from innovative
activity, such as robust trademark protection, provides a
natural engine of technical progress on which the patent
system is meant to build. See, e.g., John H. Barton, NonObviousness, 43 IDEA475, 491, 493 (2003) (noting nonpatent incentives for invention and citing WesleyM. Cohen
et al., Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability
Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or
Not) (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research WorkingPaper No.
W7552,2000), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/
w7552 (last visited Aug. 9, 2006) for survey evidence
indicating the importanceof non-patent incentives).
Patents are not necessary for advancesthat are the natural
outcomeof the competitive market in a particular technology
and its concomitant routine level of research and development. Patents, rather, ought to inspire those inventive efforts
and disclosures that wouldotherwise be deterred by the free
riding of competitors. Granting patents on innovations that
are not substantial enough to require a patent incentive
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imposeshigh social costs--including the transaction costs of
licensing, deterrence of follow-on invention, and the administrative and litigation costs of unnecessarypatent examination and enforcement. See Joseph S. Miller, Building a
Better Bounty: Litigation-Stage Rewards for Defeating
Patents, 19 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 667, 690 (2004) (discussing
social costs of improvidentlygranted patents).
The appropriate level of inventiveness necessary for patentability mayvary by technological area. Sometechnological areas, such as software, tend to be highly cumulativeand
incremental. In such an art, it will often be well within the
competenceof the ordinarily skilled artisan to take pieces of
prior technology and meld them together into a new whole.
Other areas, such as pharmaceuticals, maybe less predictable
and mayrequire large investments and long years of research
to make significant advances. The statutory requirement
reflects this variance because it judges obviousnessfrom the
perspectiveof the "personhavingordinary skill in the art" (or
PHOSITA),thus incorporating differences in the baseline
competitive processes in different fields. The PHOSITA
perspective is critical if we are both to avoid awarding
patents for developments that would arise as a matter of
course in the ordinary application of inventive skill and to
avoid denying patents to inventions that appear deceptively
simple in hindsight but pose problems not evident to the
outsider to a particular technology.
In Graham,this Court laid out three central factual questions which must be answeredin order for the legal determination of obviousness to be made: "the scope and content of
the prior art are to be determined; differences betweenthe
prior art and the claims at issue are to be ascertained; and the
level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art resolved." Graham,
383 U.S. at 17. This Court also noted the potential for the
"circumstances surrounding the origin of the subject matter
sought to be patented" to provide someadditional "indicia of
obviousness or nonobviousness." The Grahamfactors, along
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with the non-technical "secondary considerations," provide
input for answering the legal question of obviousness. They
amplyguard against the application of hindsight by focusing
the entire inquiry on the context in which an invention was
made.
II. The Federal Circuit’s Suggestion Test Collapses the
Legal Determinationof Nonobviousnessinto a Factual
Determinationof Whatis Available in the Prior Art.
Over the past two decades, the Federal Circuit has gradually developedan obviousnesstest whicheffectively replaces
the broad legal and policy considerations properly embodied
in the obviousnessdetermination with a factual inquiry into
what is already available in the prior art. TheFederal Circuit
permits invalidation of patents (or denial of applications) for
obviousness only whenchallengers can present evidence of a
"suggestion or incentive," ACSHospital Systems, Inc. v.
Montefiore Hospital, 732 F.2d 1572, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1984),
"teaching, suggestion or incentive," In re Geiger, 815 F.2d
686, 688 (Fed. Cir. 1987), "reason, suggestion, or motivation," In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1447(Fed. Cir. 1992),
"teaching, suggestion or motivation," In re Raynes, 7 F.3d
1037, 1039 (Fed. Cir. 1993), to combinepreviously existing
technologies in the prior art. Evidenceof such a "suggestion
to combine" "in the prior art" is part of the prima facie
showing of obviousness that patent examiners or later
litigants must make. See In re Kahn,441 F.3d 977, 986 (Fed.
Cir. 2006); Karsten Mfg. Corp. v. Cleveland Golf Co., 242
F.3d 1376, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2001), ("in holding an invention
obvious in view of a combination of references, there must
be somesuggestion, motivation, or teaching in the prior art
that wouldhave led a person of ordinary skill in the art to
select the references and combine them in the way that
wouldproducethe claimed invention.")
This suggestion test cannot be found anywherein Section
103 or in any other part of the Patent Act. This Court has
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directly addressed the issue of obviousness on several
occasions. None of its discussions gives any basis for
grafting a suggestion test onto the statutory language. See
e.g., Graham,383 U.S. at 17-18 (laying out the factors
underlying the nonobviousnessdetermination). Indeed, in its
seminal interpretation of Section 103 of the Patent Act in
Graham,this Court not only discussed the factors relevant to
the determination of obviousness without once mentioning a
"suggestiontest," it also reversedan appellate court’s finding
of nonobviousnessdespite the appellate court’s conclusion
that there was "nothing in the prior art suggesting [the]
unique combination of these old features" in the claimed
invention. Graham,383 U.S. at 30. Thus, it would appear
that the Federal Circuit’s suggestion test wouldhave led to
the opposite result in Graham
itself.
Whilethe suggestiontest is framedas a factual inquiry, it,
unlike the factual inquiries laid out by this Court in Graham,
essentially preemptsthe legal inquiry by focusing on what is
already in the prior art, leaving scant space for legal and
expert assessment. History and commonsense teach that
competition itself is an engine of innovation, propelling
progress even without the incentives provided by patent
rights. Yet the suggestion test answersthe legal and policy
questions of obviousness by imposing a uniformly low
standard which is little more than a generalized novelty
requirement.
IlL The Suggestion Test Lowers the Nonobviousness
Standard by Disregarding the Ordinary ProblemSolving Ability of the Skilled Artisan.
By replacing the legal inquiry into obviousness with a
factual inquiry into motivation to combine, the suggestion
test essentially swallowsthe obviousnessinquiry. It obscures
the importanceof the factual inquiry into the level of ordinary skill in the art mandatedby this Court and required by
the statutory commandto judge obviousness from the
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perspective of the "person having ordinary skill in the art."
As Professor RebeccaEisenberg has noted:
[The Federal Circuit] has all but ignored the
statutory directive that judgmentsof nonobviousness be madefrom the perspective of the
PHOSITA
[person having ordinary skill in the
art]. Today, PHOSITA
sits on the sidelines of
obviousness analysis.
Courts consult
PHOSITA
on the scope, content, and meaning
of prior art references but not on the ultimate
question of whether the invention would have
been obvious at the time it was madein light
of the prior art.
Rebecca Eisenberg, Obvious to Whom?Evaluating Inventions from the Perspective of PHOSITA,19 Berkeley Tech.
L.J. 885, 888 (2004).
TheFederal Circuit’s analysis in this very case exemplifies
the short shrift givento the personof ordinaryskill in the art.
TheFederal Circuit stated that, besides explicit suggestions
"in the prior art references," implicit suggestions to combine
might be found "in the knowledgeof those of ordinary skill
in the art that certain references.., are of special interest or
importance in the field;" or "from the nature of the problem
to be solved, leading inventors to look to references relating
to possible solutions to that problem." Pet. App. at 6a.
(Citations omitted). The District Court had based its finding
of a suggestion or motivation to combinereferences in part
on the "nature of the problem to be solved." Pet. App. at
42a-43a. The Federal Circuit rejected the District Court’s
findings because the "nature of the problem to be solved"
provides a cognizable motivation to combinereferences only
when"two prior art references address the precise problem
that the patentee was trying to solve." Pet. App. at 12a. In
this instance, the problems addressed by the references did
not track the specifics of the patent at issue quite precisely
enough. Pet. App. at 12a-13a.
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Despitelip service to the inquiry into whetherthe nature of
the problemwouldhave "led a person of ordinary skill in the
art to combinethe prior art teachings in the particular manner
claimed," Pet. App.at 12a, the Federal Circuit’s analysis paid
no attention to howsuch a person would have viewed the
prior art references in light of the problemthe patentee was
trying to solve. There was apparently no room for the
possibility that a personof ordinaryskill in the art mightfind
it obviousto apply prior art technologyto a problemslightly
different from the problemarticulated in the prior art reference.
As applied in this case, the knowledgeof those of ordinary
skill in the art is used to help determinethe scope and content
of the applicable prior art, but there appears to be no room
for the application of routine problem-solving skill. The
nature of the problem similarly serves only to motivate a
search for references addressing the specific problemat hand.
This approach limits the role of the PHOSITA
to that of a
sort of reference librarian, whocan locate appropriate prior
art references but is apparently incapable of applying or
recombiningthem with even a modicumof creativity in light
of his or her knowledgeand skill.
Thesuggestion test is not neededfor selecting whichreferences should be considered in assessing obviousness, however. The "scope and content of the prior art" is determined
by the doctrine of analogousarts. See, e.g., In re Bigio, 381
F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ("Twoseparate tests define
scope of analogousprior art: (1) whetherthe art is from the
samefield of endeavor, regardless of the problemaddressed
and, (2) if the reference is not within the field of the inventor’s endeavor, whether the reference still is reasonably
pertinent to the particular problemwith whichthe inventor is
involved."). See also Graham,383 U.S. at 35 ("The problems confronting Scoggin and the insecticide industry were
not insecticide problems; they were mechanical closure
problems. Closure devices in such a closely related art as
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pouring spouts for liquid containers are at the very least
pertinent references.") Once the scope and content of the
prior art are determined, obviousness should be assessed by
considering what advancesan ordinarily skilled artisan could
make based on that art, not by determining whether the
references address the sameproblem as the invention under
review.
Somerecent Federal Circuit opinions have begun to suggest a broader view of the scope of implicit suggestions to
combineprior art references. See, e.g., Princeton Biochernicals, Inc. v. BeckmanCoulter, Inc., 411 F.3d 1332(Fed. Cir.
2005); Ruiz v. A.B. ChanceCo., 357 F.3d 1270 (Fed. Cir.
2004). The recent opinion in In re Kahn, 441 F.3d at 988, for
example,states that "in considering motivation in the obviousness analysis, the problemexaminedis not the specific
problemsolved by the invention but the general problemthat
confronted the inventor before the invention was made."
Accordingto this recent take on the suggestion test:
[t]he motivation-suggestion-teachingtest asks
not merely what the references disclose, but
whethera person of ordinary skill in the art,
possessed with the understandings and knowledge reflected in the prior art, and motivated
by the general problem facing the inventor,
would have been led to makethe combination
recited in the claims. Fromthis it maybe determined whether the overall disclosures,
teachings, and suggestionsof the prior art, and
the level of skill in the art--i.e., the understandings and knowledge of persons having
ordinaryskill in the art at the time of the invention-support the legal conclusion of obviousness.
ld. (Emphasisadded).
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Whilethis attempt to employa broader version of the suggestion test is an improvementover the narrower version
applied in manyother cases, it still does not solve the underlying failings of the "suggestion test." Evenhere, in perhaps
its broadest statement of the test to date, the Federal Circuit
does not acknowledgethat ordinary skill encompassesmore
than knowledge.The court explicitly equates "the level of
skill in the art" with "understandings and knowledge."This
equation ignores the part of ordinary skill comprisingroutine
experimentation and application of ordinary tools, methods,
and problem-solving abilities and continues to preempt the
legal assessment of whether a particular advance was sufficient to warrant a patent by a factual inquiry into the content
of the prior art.
"Trained scientists, engineers and other practitioners are
seldomso dull-witted as to unvaryingly require the specific,
step-by-step combination of elements from the prior art."
John R. Thomas,Formalismat the Federal Circuit, 52 Am.
U. L. Rev. 771, 802 (2003). As Professor Eisenberg has
noted, "[a]ctive practitioners of a technologybring moreto a
problem than maybe found in written prior art, including
training, judgment, intuition, and tacit knowledgeacquired
through field experience. Scientific and technological work
involve the application of craft skills that are familiar to
practitioners but defy explicit articulation." Eisenberg, 19
Berkeley Tech. L.J., at 897, citing JeromeR. Ravetz, Scientific Knowledgeand its Social Problems75-76 (1971).
The Federal Trade Commissionhas also recognized the
extent to which the suggestion test neglects the ordinary
creativity of the PHOSITA:
Inventive processes typically involve judgment, experience, and commonsense capable
of connecting somedots. The suggestion test,
rigidly applied, assumes away a PHOSITA’s
typical levels of creativity and insight and
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supports findings of nonobviousness even
whenonly a modicumof additional insight is
needed .... The presence of ’specific and definitive art references with clear motivationof
how to combine those references’ may confirm the obviousness of an invention. In contrast, the absenceof such prior art references
does not provide any evidence about whether
a PHOSITAcould have combined prior art
references to achieve the invention, given the
typical level of insight in that field.
Federal Trade Commission, To Promote Innovation: The
Proper Balance of Competition and Patent Lawand Policy,
Chap. 4, at 14 (2003). (Emphasis added.) As the
recognizes, the presence of a suggestion, teaching or motivation to combineprior art references demonstrates obviousness, but only consideration of whether the application of
ordinary skill could have produced the claimed invention
within a reasonable time frame can determine whether the
invention meets the legal standard of non-obviousness.
TheFederal Circuit’s approach to the "nature of the problem" prong does not overcome the suggestion test’s basic
confusion of (a) the underlying factual inquiry into the
relevant context in which the claimed invention was made
with (b) the legal inquiry as to whether the associated advanceover the prior art is sufficient to warrant a patent. The
question whether the advance represented by the patent
claims is sufficiently beyondwhat wouldresult from routine
research and developmentwithout the patent incentive is not
a factual inquiry into whetherthe "nature of the problemto
be solved" wouldmotivate the invention.
The predominant role assigned to the suggestion test has
had the effect of marginalizing the determination of the
"level of ordinary skill in the art." This marginalization is
evident from a reading of the case law. Often there is no
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explicit considerationof the level of ordinary skill in the art
at all. Even whenit is nominally considered, the result is
usually a recitation of a "resume of the person of ordinary
skill in the art." Oncethis "resume" has been established,
however,it rarely, if ever, plays any role in the substantive
consideration of the obviousness issue. At the Federal
Circuit’s inception, it set out factors to be considered in
determiningthe level of ordinary skill in the art in Environmental Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co., 713 F.2d 693, 696
(Fed. Cir. 1983), yet it has rarely discussed those factors
its opinions. See Joseph P. Meara, Just Whois the Person
Having Ordinary Skill in the Art? Patent Law’s Mysterious
Personage, 77 Wash. L. Rev. 267, 278, 289 (2002) (noting
that "[a]t the end of the year 2000, only five of the court’s
obviousness opinions cited the factors of Environmental
Designs" and that in those "five subsequent nonobviousness
opinions citing the factors of Environmental Designs, the
Federal Circuit has providedlittle guidancefor the use of the
factors."). Indeed, the Federal Circuit appears not to have
referred to the factors for determiningthe level of skill in the
art at all since 2000.
In effect, the Federal Circuit’s approachsubstitutes knowledge in the art--"the understandings and knowledge of
persons having ordinary skill in the art at the time of the
invention"--for skill in the art--the methods, tools, and
problem-solvingskills that are routinely applied in a particular field of technology.It substitutes factual questions about
suggestions to combinethe prior art for the legal determination of the sufficiency of the claimedadvancesin light of the
prior art.
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IV. The Federal Circuit’s Suggestion Test Precludes
Consideration of Relevant Social and EconomicFactors Indicating Obviousness
In Graham,this Court recognized that certain "secondary
considerations" "mightbe utilized to give light to the circumstances surroundingthe origin of the subject matter sought to
be patented." Graham, 383 U.S. at 17-18. Grahamlisted
"commercialsuccess, long felt but unsolved needs, failure of
others, etc." as potentially relevant "indicia of obviousnessor
nonobviousness," (emphasis added), and explicitly anticipated a "case-by-case development"of the obviousness test.
Contrary to that expectation, the Federal Circuit has frozen
the inquiry into "the circumstances surroundingthe origin of
the subject matter sought to be patented" into a rigid list of
"objective indicia of nonobviousness," Orthopedic Equipment Co. v. All OrthopedicAppliances, lnc., 707 F.2d 1376,
1379, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (emphasis added) (equating
"secondary considerations" with "objective indicia of nonobviousness"), which can only be used as a thumb on the
nonobvious side of the scale. The threshold nature of the
suggestion test turns the inquiry into contextual indications
of "obviousness or nonobviousness" into a one-wayratchet
which can only contribute to patent issuance. Without a
"motivation to combine"in the prior art, a claimed invention
is never deemedobvious, regardless of the circumstances
surrounding its development.Onthe other hand, the Federal
Circuit requires that "objective indicia of nonobviousness"be
considered in every case----even whenthere is a finding of a
motivation to combine. Stratoflex, lnc. v. Aeroquip Corp.,
713 F.2d 1530, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ("[E]vidence rising
of the so-called ’secondary considerations’ must always
whenpresent be considered en route to a determination of
obviousness.")
Recent experience suggests that there are additional contextual factors that should inform the obviousness inquiry.
Social and economic developments may strongly evidence
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the obviousness of particular advances. Circumstantial
indications of obviousness might include technical advances
within or outside of the particular field of the invention at
issue that motivate the combination at hand. For example,
the developmentof personal computers and the intemet and
other computing advances have given rise to numerous
opportunities to makeuse of computers in ways that were
obvious to those skilled in the art once the technology
becameavailable. Methodological advances in the biotechnology area have led to results that manyhave argued should
not have been patentable due to the ease with which they
could be achieved once the tools became available. As
Professors Dan L. Burk and Mark Lemley remark, "the
Federal Circuit has bent over backwardsto find biotechnological inventions nonobvious, even if the prior art demonstrates a clear plan for producingthe invention." Is Patent
Law Technology-Specific?, 17 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1155,
1156 (2002). Especially in fast-moving fields, nearly simultaneous development of the same advance by more than one
party mayindicate the obviousness of the advance even if
there is a race to patent the result. (This will not alwaysbe
the case, of course, since sometimes near-simultaneous
developmentmaybe the result of patent-inspired investment
solving a particular problem.) At a minimum,nearly concurrent development by others whodo not race to patent the
results is strong evidencethat an advancewasobvious.
Other social changesmaygive rise to or drawattention to a
particular problem, the solution to which becomesobvious
once attention is paid to it. Achangein the law, for example,
mightgive rise to a newpossibility to combineprior technology in a commerciallyattractive way. See Jay Dratler, Jr.,
Alice in WonderlandMeets the U.S. Patent System, 38 Akron
L. Rev. 299, 302 (2005) (arguing that the patent claims
issue in the case of State Street Bank& Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998),
involved merely "pedestrian arithmetic calculations, mostly
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as required by rules of the SECand other accounting and tax
authorities."); Richard H. Stem, Scope-of-Protection Problems with Patents and Copyrights on Methods of Doing
Business, 10 FordhamIntell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 105
(1999), App. A, (comparingthe patent claims State Str eet
Bank with U.S. tax law concerning flow-through of pool
income to a partner and avoidance of taxation of the pool
entity and purporting to showthat the claims merely track
the applicable IRS regulations). Other social and cultural
changesmayhave similar effects. See, e.g., Scott & Williams
v. Aristo Hosiery Co., 300 F. 622, 624-27 (D.N.Y. 1924) (L.
Hand, J.) (concluding that a newstocking seam arrangement
invented in response to changing consumer tastes was an
unpatentable variation of prior art seams, notwithstandingits
great commercialsuccess), aff’d 7 F.2d 1003(2d Cir. 1925).
Consideration of the wayin which changing technological,
social, or economiccontext can give rise to obvious combinations of prior technologies is in somesense the converse of
the "long-felt need" indicator of nonobviousness. If a need
has only recently arisen or becomeapparent, a solution may
become obvious at around the same time. Whenthe obviousness standard does not recognize this possibility, each
social or technical developmentcan lead to a "gold rush" of
socially wasteful efforts to patent combinations of wellknowntechnology in response to that development.
Therubric of inventive context also provides an appropriate place for the consideration of howold componentsof a
newtechnology interact. This Court’s most recent precedent
on the subject of obviousness has been interpreted by some
as setting out a special "synergytest" for interactions among
components of so-called "combination patents." See Sakraida v. Ag Pro, lnc., 425 U.S. 273,282 (1976) ("We cannot
agree that the combinationof these old elements to produce
an abrupt release of water directly on the barn floor from
storage tanks or pools can properly be characterized as
synergistic.");
Anderson’s-Black Rock, lnc. v. Pavement
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Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57, 61 (1969) ("A combination
elements mayresult in an effect greater than the sumof the
several effects taken separately. Nosuch synergistic result is
argued here."), both citing Great A&PTea Co., 340 U.S. at
152, ("Courts should scrutinize combination patent claims
with a care proportioned to the difficulty and improbability
of finding invention in an assembly of old elements.") 2 A
"synergy test" was rejected by the Federal Circuit and
criticized by commentators because of the difficulty in
differentiating combinationpatents from all others and the
vagueness of the synergy concept. See Stratoflex, 713 F.2d
at 1540 ("A requirement for "synergism" or a "synergistic
effect" is nowhere found in the statute.., synergism may
point toward nonobviousness,but its absence has no place in
evaluating the evidence on obviousness"); Chore-Time
Equipment, lnc. v. CumberlandCorp., 713 F.2d 774, 781
(Fed. Cir. 1983) ("References to synergismas a patentability
requirement are, therefore, unnecessary and confusing.") See
also Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success and Patent
Standards: EconomicPerspectives on Innovation, 76 Cal. L.
Rev. 803, n. 39 (1988) (describing discontent with
synergy test). Amici do not advocate implementation of a
"synergy test." However, the presence of unanticipated
effects from the interactions
among components of an
invention maybe evidence of nonobviousness. Conversely,
the fact that a novel developmentconsists only of a combination of prior art elements------each of which performs the
samefunction as it did in prior art settings--may be evidence
that the combination was an obvious one, perhaps motivated
by somesocial change.
In sum, various contextual factors mayhave spurred the
combination or extension of previously available technology
in a way that would have been obvious to a person having
2 See, however,
Briefof Economists
andLegalHistoriansfiled in this
casefor a historical perspectiveonthis Court’sobviousness
jurisprudence.
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ordinary skill in the art in light of those factors. TheFederal
Circuit’s suggestion test, combinedwith its narrow focus on
"indicia of nonobviousness," ignores contextual indications
of obviousness. This one-sided view of the inventive milieu
leads to the issuance of patents on routine advances that
result from applying ordinary inventive skill to changing
circumstances.
V. The Suggestion Test is Not Reasonably Applicable by
the PTOand Negates the Agency’s Expertise
Besides the substantive failings detailed in the preceding
sections, the Federal Circuit’s approachfails to take advantage of the technical expertise of the examiner corps and
arguably undermines the role of the PTOas a matter of
administrative law. See Stuart Minor Benjaminand Arti K.
Rai, Who’sAfraid of the APA?What the Patent System Can
Learn from Administrative Law, 95 Geo. L.J. (forthcoming
2006) (arguing that the Federal Circuit’s approach to patent
law is inconsistent with standard administrative law doetrines). 3 Moreover,the suggestion test is extremelydifficult
for the PTOto implementeffectively. Thoughthis particular
case arises out of infringementlitigation, it is important in
crafting an approachto the obviousnessissue to keep in mind
that "the primary responsibility for sifting out unpatentable
material lies in the Patent Office." Graham,383 U.S. at 18.
The inability of the PTOto weedout obvious patents under
the Federal Circuit’s suggestion test is extremelydetrimental
to the health of the patent system because, as this Court has
recognized, "[t]o await litigation is--for all practical purposes-to debilitate the patent system." Id. The difficulty
the PTOhas in applying the suggestion test stems from the
Federal Circuit’s strict requirementthat the patent examiner
search for and present additional evidencein the record when
the examinerseeks to rely on the knowledgeof one skilled in
3 It is our understandingthat a copyof this article will be filed in this
case by Professors Benjaminand Rai.
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the art or the nature of the problemto be solved to demonstrate a suggestion to combineprior art references.
Federal Circuit precedent makesclear that patent examiners cannot rely on commonknowledgein the art or on their
owntechnical knowledgein the art as a basis for rejecting
patent applications. See, e.g., In re Lee, 277 F.3d 1338, 1345
(Fed. Cir. 2002) ("’Commonknowledge and commonsense,’
even if assumedto derive from the agency’sexpertise, do not
substitute for authority whenthe law requires authority.")
(Citation omitted). As a result, the Federal Circuit has
forbidden the PTO to deny a patent based on common
knowledgein the art unless the examinercan point to specific
evidence of a teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine
the particular existing references and has limited the ability
of the PTOto rely on official notice as it is generally conceived in the agency context. See Benjaminand Rai, 95 Geo.
L.J. at.
Excessively stringent evidentiary requirements and framing
of the ultimate judgment of obviousness as essentially a
factual inquiry hamperthe PTO’sapplication of its expertise
to the obviousness question. Commonknowledge is not
often the subject of detailed written exposition, makingit
difficult and costly for the patent examinerto find evidence
of common
knowledgeto meet the Federal Circuit’s suggestion test. As the National Academyof Sciences recently
explained in its report on the patent system: "[S]cientists,
artisans, and creative people generally speaking strive to
publish non-obviousinformation. So if it is obvious to those
of skill in the art to combinereferences, it is unlikely that
they will publish such information." Stephen A. Merrill et
al., National Research Council, National Academyof Sciences, .4 Patent Systemfor the 21~t Century(2004)at 90.
Moreover, technological advances and expansive interpretations of the scope of patentable subject matter have resulted
in the issuance of patents in areas, such as software and
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business methodpatents, in which the commonknowledgeof
the art has not traditionally been documentedin easily
accessible forms such as patents and academicpublications.
The Federal Circuit’s emphasis on documentation of what is
widely knownin the art is particularly problematic for
patenting in these areas. See, e.g., MargoA. Bagley, lnternet
Business Model Patents: Obvious by Analogy, 7 Mich.
Telecomm. & Tech. L. Rev. 253, 279-80 (2000-2001)
(discussing the limited availability of documentaryprior art
in the areas of business methodsand software). In attempting to find documentationof what is commonlyknownin the
art, patent examiners must waste time and resources searching for specific articulations of common,but largely tacit,
knowledge. This is particularly unfortunate since PTO
examinersare selected and trained in the subject matter of the
patents they examineand their duties naturally keep them up
to date.
In sum, the Federal Circuit’s obviousnesstest fails to take
advantageof agencyexpertise and all but requires the PTOto
base its analyses on documentaryevidence of obviousness,
whichwill often be difficult and costly to find or unavailable.
Thetest will thus allow patents to issue in manycases where
combining pre-existing technologies would have been an
obviousstep for a personhavingordinaryskill in the art.
VI. The Suggestion Test’s LowStandard of Patentability
is BadPatent Policy
Thelowstandard for patentability that results fromapplication of the suggestion test leads inevitably to the grant of
patent rights to combinations of existing technological
knowledgefor which no patent incentive was needed. Such
patents not only do not "promote the Progress of... useful
Arts," see U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 8, they havepernicious
social effects. Amici are convincedthat the suggestion test
results in the issuance and enforcementof manysuch patents
that should be declared invalid as obvious. See, e.g., Glynn
S. Lunney, Jr., E-Obviousness, 7 Mich. Telecomm.& Tech.
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L. Rev. 363, 370-379(2000) (presenting a statistical study
showinga drop in Federal Circuit patent invalidations for
obviousness, and identifying the Circuit’s suggestion test as
one of the causes).
The availability of patents on obvious combinationsoverwhelmsthe Patent and TrademarkOffice with applications
for patents on obvious combinations of previously existing
technologies, promotessocially wasteful races to patent these
obvious advances, and raises patent search costs for those
seeking to combineexisting technologies. See, e.g., BronwynH. Hall and Dietmar Harhoff, Post-Grant Reviews in the
U.S. Patent System--Design Choices and Expected Impact,
19 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 989, 992-1000 (2004) (discussing
potential problemscaused by low quality patents, presenting
evidence of issuance of lower quality patents by the PTO,
and relating the issuance of lower quality patents to the
suggestion test for obviousness).
The overpatenting that results from the Federal Circuit’s
suggestion test creates an unnecessary drag on innovation
through higher prices to consumers and transaction costs
associated with searching for, licensing, and enforcing these
unnecessary patents. Those interested only in combining
existing technologies in obvious ways must nonetheless
expend resources searching for possible patents on those
obvious combinations. Anyonewhowants to use an unnecessarily patented combination of technologies will have to
negotiate permission from and pay royalties to the ownersof
any patents on the individual elements, and to the ownerof
the patent in the combination. The costs of patents that are
unnecessary to promoteinnovation also include "the benefits
lost whena course of research is foregoneout of fear that a
product cannot be producedwithout obtaining a license that
maybe unavailable. Even whena product is produced, there
maybe costs in restructuring a research programto design
around existing patents." Barton, 43 IDEAat 475, 494.
Whentwo or moreparties can block the practical application
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of technology, the difficulty and social cost of developing
that practical application increases significantly, raising the
likelihood of "patent thickets." See, e.g., Carl Shapiro,
Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licensing, Patent
Pools, and Standard Setting, in Innovation Policy and the
Economy(AdamJaffe et al., eds., 2001); see also Michael
A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter
Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research,
Science, May1, 1998, at 698-99.
The low threshold of nonobviousness promotes undesirable business practices. It provides incentives to invest in
socially wasteful efforts to patent run-of-the-mill combinations of previously knowntechnologies and makesit easier to
"trap" competitors in inadvertent infringement, thus motivating the "patent troll" business model. It also motivates the
practice of "evergreening"--using
minor improvement
patents to retain control over a technology (such as a drug)
that wouldotherwise go into the public domain.In addition,
it motivates true innovators to divert someof their resources
awayfrom further technical advancementand toward identifying and claiming all possible combinations of their new
technologies with existing technologies in order to prevent
others from getting patents that would block important and
obviousapplications of their technologies.
Thepredictable result of the availability of patents on obvious combinations of existing elements is that it becomes
moredifficult to bring the benefits of technologyto society,
thus underminingthe ultimate goal of patent law.
VII. This Court Should Mandatea Return to the Graham
Approach, Asking Whether the Claimed Invention
Could Be MadeBy Routine Application of the Level
of Ordinary Skill in the Art
Theperspective of the "person of ordinary skill in the art"
mustbe brought back to its rightful place in the legal inquiry
into obviousness. While the occasional appearance in
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Federal Circuit opinions of more leeway for suggestions
stemmingfrom the "nature of the problem" is an improvementover the strict approachevident in this case, it is not a
solution. The expansion of the "nature of the problemto be
solved" prong hides a legal decision within a supposed
question of fact and masks an inadequate determination of
the level of skill in the art. Especially whena thorough
investigation of the level of skill in the art is not made,
expanded use of the "nature of the problem" prong also
invites a back-doorre-entry of hindsight bias because it is
most likely to be applied to simpler technologies where the
connection of the nature of the problemto be solved to the
claimedinvention is most apparent to courts.
Thepresence of a "teaching, suggestion, or motivation to
combine"prior art references evidences obviousness, but the
absence of such a suggestion to combineis not an appropriate
test for nonobviousness.This Court should require a return
to the inquiry set out in Graham.The analogous arts doetrine provides a methodologyfor determining the scope and
content of the prior art which----especiallyif updatedto allow
for progress in search technology and the increasing importance of interdisciplinary research and developmentteamsm
is entirely adequate for the task. Arobust inquiry into the
level of ordinaryskill in the art wouldset the stage for a legal
determinationof whetherthe application of that ordinary skill
to the problem at hand wouldhave led to the claimed solution in the course of baseline competition.
Thefactual determination of the level of ordinary skill in
the art should not be limited to the content of prior art
references, the commonknowledgeof those in the art, and
any suggestions to combinethe art that are found in those
references or knowledge. It should also encompass the
PHOSITA’s
ordinary inventive skills, the tools and methods
routinely applied in her field, and the kinds of experimentation she does and problemsshe solves as a matter of course.
As with the determination of analogous arts, the determination of level of ordinary skill shouldevolve with the technology itself, incorporating, for example, the extent to which
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research and development in a particular field routinely
drawson interdisciplinary teams.
Oncea morecompletepicture of the ordinary skill in the
art is drawn, the legal inquiry as to obviousnesscan proceed
to determine "if the difference between the new thing and
what wasknownbefore is not considered sufficiently great to
warrant a patent." Becausea serious inquiry into the level of
skill in the art wouldincorporate not only what is already
knownin a particular field, but also what is routinely invented, it wouldnaturally incorporate technological differences in the competitive baseline. Anobviousness standard
that takes into account the routine experimentation and
problem-solvingskill of the PHOSITA
is also self-correcting
to some extent. If a more stringent patentability standard
reduces the baseline progress in a particular field, a patentability standard based on the routine level of skill and
progress in the field will adjust so that more patents are
issued.
With the Grahamparadigm reinstated, the consideration
given to the technical and social context in whicha claimed
invention was made should expand to incorporate not only
factorswsuch as long-felt need--evidencing nonobviousness, but also factors--such as a newlyappreciated need or a
recent technological development--suggesting the obviousness of a claimed invention.
All obviousness tests are susceptible to two types of error----erroneous issuance and erroneous rejection. Both types
are socially costly. The Federal Circuit’s suggestion test
bends over backwards to prevent hindsight (and hence
prevent the rejection of patents that should have issued), but
does little to prevent unwarranted patent issuance. The
Grahamapproach, on the other hand, mitigates the risk of
either form of error--avoiding hindsight with its structured
inquiry into the factual context at the time of invention, while
protecting against the issuance of patents on routine advances
with a robust inquiry into the level of ordinary skill in the art
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and the inventive context.
serves the public welfare.

The Grahamapproach better

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should set a standard
for the obviousnessdetermination that prevents the patenting
of numerousadvances that wouldhave occurred as a result of
routine development, returns the focus to the problemsolving capability of the person having ordinary skill in the
art, accommodatescontextual evidence of obviousness as
well as nonobviousness, and makesroomfor the application
of USPTO
expertise.
Respectfully submitted,
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